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Mao Tse-tung's Revolution Continues?
HEWITI

D.

.ADAMS

Cl.emson University
From about the first of February some symptoms hav e pointed to
a possible resurgence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of
1966-1968. Ther e was a reappearance of the wall posters, often vague
criticism of "persons in authority," specific criticism of the late Lin Piao
and of Confucius. These signs, coupled with the obviously approaching
problem of succession, made it appear that a new uph eaval in China
was imminent.
The criticism of Lin Piao as a traitor was tied in with his alleged
adherence to Confucian ideas. Confucius was attacked on ideological
grounds. He was accused of promulgating "feudal" ideas of class structure. His "doctine of the mean" came in for special attack. 1 The Legatist
school was also attacked for its "feudal" emphasis; but Confucianism
was the chief target, pictured as the very denial of revolutionary activity .
Revolution has so dominated our thinking about China in this century that we find it difficult to separate the two. Scholars have identifi ed
the Chinese Revolution as lasting for fifty or a hundred years,2 while
Mao Tse-tung himself looked upon the maint enance of perpetual revolutionary favor as nec essary to the achievement of the regene ration of
China.a Mao was especially concerned with the continuation of the revolution after the old lead ership passed on. He also had the problem of
opposition in the Party to his policies and of a lack of discipline.
"All this is extremely harmful to the interests of the revolution.
Party committees at every level must discuss this matter again and
again and work earnestly to overcome such indiscipline anl anarchy
so that all the powers that can and must be centralized will be concentrated in the hands of the central committee and its agencies." 4
The revolution then, in the view of Mao in 1966, had not ended,
but it was necessary both to intensify "redness" and to reestablish a unity
1
2

Peking Review, February 1, 1974 through August 30, 1974 are examples.
Wolfgang Franke, A Century of Chinese Revolution, 1851-1949; Basil Blackwell (tr), Harper and Row, New York, 1971.
Rankir Vohra, The Chinese Revolution, 1900-1950; Houghton Mil:Bin Co.,
Boston, 1974.
3 Andre Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, Ter ence Kilmartin. (tr),
Holt, Rinehart and
Winston; 1968, pp. 366-368.
4 Peking Review, 30 June 1967.
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of revolutionary goals for China. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the result. The Red Guards not only became imbued with Mao's
revolutionary fervor, but also carried the message to their elders. Mao's
opponents were purged from their positions of responsibility in the Party
and in the government. To stamp out reactionary elements required positive action. "Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it
won't fall. This is also like sweeping the floor; as a rule, where the broom
does not reach, the dust will not vanish of itself." 11 Mao gave the objectives of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as "consolidating the
dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and
building socialism." 6
Success in the removal of reactionary elements and in the revival of
revolutionary spirit brought an end to the Cultural Revolution in 1968.
There was to be no end to the need for revolutionary spirit, however. In
his report to the inth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in
1969, Lin Piao said "all revolutionary comrades must be clearly aware
that class struggle will by no means cease in the ideological and political
spheres. The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie by no
means dies out with our seizure of power." 7
Lin Piao was identified in the new constitution of the Chinese Communist Party as Mao Tse-tung's "close comrade-in-arms and successor." 8
His leadership of the Peoples' Liberation Army was dedicated to the
continuation of the revolution. Ironically, Lin in his turn was to become
the focus of vituperation in the big character posters of 1974.
In 1969, in the proposed Constitution of the Chinese Communist
Party, the socialist society was characterized as an historical phase of
considerable duration. It was pointed out that
"In this historical phase, classes, class contradictions and class
struggle will exist throughout, as will the struggle between the two
roads of socialism and capitalism, the danger of capitalist restoration, and the threat of subversion and aggression by imperialism and
modern revisionism. These contradictions can be resolved only by
relying on the Marxist theory and practice of uninterrupted
revolution." 9

It seems clear that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
did not view the end of the struggle with the forces of Chiang Kai-shek
11Mao Tse-tung Selected Works (hereafter S. W.);
Peking, 1961, V. IV1 p. 19.
6 Quoted in PeKing Review, January 18, 1974.
7 New York Times, April 29, 1969, p. 12.
s Ibid., January 8, 1969, p. 6.
o Ibid.
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in 1949 nor the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1968
as the end of the revolution: in China. Revolution was to remain a continuous process under the guidance of the party until the reaching of
the ultimate objective, "the realization of Communism." 10
Mao's conception of what constitutes revolution may be somehow
different from our own. As Professor Wu Tien-wei has so cogently
pointed out, Mao Tse-tung has come under little direct Western influence. "Save for Marxism-Leninism, Mao's utopianism and nationalism
are of Chinese origin." 11 Mao's romantic revolutionary spirit was no
doubt influenced by such traditional Chinese stories as contained in the
Romance of the Three Kingdoms. But does Mao's espousal of perpetual
revolution imply that open struggle will occur again and again? Will we
see repetitious of the Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution or will
struggle be a matter accomplished within a framework of orderly activity
directed toward the Party's ultimate goal? As a matter of practice, the
revolution looks to be little different than measures taken by any government struggling to bring "modernization." Indeed, Mao's revolutionary
genius lies largely in his pragmatic exploitation of the opportunity offered
by the delays in achieving "modernization" in China. As Stuart Schram
points out, "these events [the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] are
a logical culmination of Mao's life. A central theme ... has been Mao's
participation, over half a century, in the effort of ,the Chinese to modernize and develop their country, and at the same time to remain themselves." 12
The struggle, under communist leadership, for "modernization" in
China has resulted in modest rates of economic growth over the past
15 years-perhaps 7 or 8 percent a year. There have been extensive
changes in social structure and social institutions, some achieved by
ruthless methods. There has been mass equalization of income and of
perogative. These changes could be considered revolutionary in nature;
changes such as the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution would meet our popular conceptions of "revolution." 13
Ibid.
Tien-wei Wu, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought in Chinese and Marxian Tradition,"
a paper delivered before the southeastern Regional Conference of the Association
for Asian Studies at Rock Hill, S. C. January 29 and 30, 1971.
12 Stuart Schram, Moo Tse-tung, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1967, p. 343.
13 "A complete or drastic change of any kind."
"Overthrow of a government, form of gove=ent,
or social system, with
another taking its place."
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2d ed), The World Publishing
Company, Cleveland, 1965, V: II, p. 1553.
10
11
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Revolution is not so evident in much that has happened and is
happening since the Cultural Revolution. In spite of Mao's opposition
to "the theory of 'many centers,' that is ,the theory of 'no center,' mountain
stronghold mentality, sectarianism and all other reactionary bourgeois
trends which undermine working class leade rship ," 14 there has been a
move toward decentralization in many areas of Chinese a.ffairs. Greater
responsibilities in finance, farming, small industry, education and social
services have been given to regional and local institutions-provincial
governments and communes. If this trend were to continue, it would be
in the Chinese tradition of regionalism and localism-hardly revolutionary. There is a school of thought which asserts that China since the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been run by regional Inilitary
commanders. 15
That decentralization will probably continue is a result of development. As the economy becomes more pluralistic and decentralized, close
central control becomes more difficult. There seems to be a continuing
tendency for both the peasant and the urban dweller to "go into business
for himself." At the grassroots, Mao has not succeeded in creating the
"new communist man." Among both governmental and party bureaucracies, the growth of elitism ( which was one target of the Cultural
Reveloution) is a constant danger. The recent reshufE!ing of military
leaders among the provinces seems to have been an effort to prev ent
the establishment of too-strong power bases.
This trend toward regionalism or decentralization should not be
over-stressed, however. The docb.ines and methods of party discipline
( i.e. the cheng-feng movement) and the Stalinist model of industrialization have resulted in a notable conformity, at least on the surface, among
the people and an effective central control of key parts of the economy.
An objective of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the
increase in industrial and agricultura l production through intensification
of "redness." The term "Cultural Revolution" was no new one. In a
speech by Lin Feng in June, 1960,16 the term was used in connection
with promotion of the "walking with two legs" slogan. As used by Lin,
the term "Cultura l Revolution" involved the use of educational work to
meet the needs of economic construction-to
the stepping up of
production.
The idea of reform of education in order to increase production
was carried forward into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The
Hsinhua News Agency, August 11, 1968.
Jurgen Domes, The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972, Rudiger Machetzki
(tr), Praeger, New York, 1973, is an example.
16 Stewart Fraser ( ed.), Chinese Communist Education, John Wiley and Sons,
New York, 1965, pp. 376-385.
14

10
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intensity of the struggle through which education passed and the outcome are well recounted by William Hinton 17 and Peter Seybolt. 18
An essential element in the question of education is "for whom"
are the opportunities to be made available. Mao felt that the person
best qualified to combine theory and practice was the person who had
worked before acquiring theory. The worker, peasant and soldier would
be most important. Of these, the poor peasant had first place in Mao's
thoughts. "Without the poor peasant class ... , it would have been impossible to bring about the ... revolutionary condition in the countryside, or to overthrow the local tyrants and evil gentry and complete the
democratic revolution." 19 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
resulted in priority in educational opportunity being given to poor
peasants, workers, and soldiers. Origin, not intelligence or mastery of
books, became the important qualification .
Bureaucrats underwent a process of "going down" to work among
peasants or industrial workers. An intimacy with the masses and their
problems became a necessary ingredient for qualification as a party or
governmental bureaucrat. Richard Pfeffer, in an article in the book,
China's Developmental Experience,20 gives an excellent summary of
bureaucratic changes since the Cultural Revolution. Rehabilitation of
bureaucrats ( party and governmental) purged during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was widespread. The highest ranking plll'ged
official who has returned to public life is Teng Hsiano-ping, pre-Cultural
Revolution Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. He returned to
public life in the Fall of 1973, and in 1974 he, as Vice Premier, headed
the Chinese delegation to the Sixth Special Session of the United
Nations. 21 Teng has substituted for the ailing Premier Chou En-lai on a
number of public occasions recently.
Rectification of the thinking of bureaucrats and changes in the
educational system are being continued along lines established during
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution without a continuation of
revolutionary activity. The cultivation of revolutionary fervor as a goad
to production is another matter. Mao Tse-tung has said that "Revolution
means liberating the productive forces and promoting their growth." 22
By implication, Mao seems to tell us that only by keeping the revolu17 William Hinton, Hundred Days War, the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua
University, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972.
18 Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, Documents and Commentary, International Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, 1973.
19 Mao Tse-tung,
S. W. V.I., p. 83.
20 Michel Oksenberg (ed.), China's Developmental Experience, Praeger, New
York, 1973.
21 Peking Review, April 12, 1974.
2 2 Quoted in Peking Review, August 23, 1974.
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tionary spirit burning among workers can productivity increase. In the
absence of significant material incentives, the worker must be induced
to greater efforts through the use of indoctrination. Fear of an external
threa~ ( i.e. an attack by Russia) can help, but most workers will ne ed
an activity on which they can focus in order to be stimulated to selfless
efforts. The criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, and the posting of the
wall posters produced by criticism groups, seems designed to fill this
need.
Great claims of increas ed production are made for the spirit engendered by criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius. This, th en, would seem
to be the reason for the activity noted over the spring and summer. No
whipping up of revolutionary fervor through Red Guard activity; rath er,
the cooperative intellectual effort of studying selected portions of the
works of Confucius , making much of Lin Piao's expressed admiration for
Confucius, and of the treason committed by Lin Piao, th ese things are
the focus of activity.
A report in the Peking Review of the results of such study by groups
of industrial workers informs us:
'1n summing up their experience in grasping revolution and promoting production since the beginning of this year , workers in
Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin deeply realize that criticism of Lin
Piao and Confucius is a powerful motive force for developing the
social productive forces. They pl edge to continue the criticism of
Lin Piao and Confucius and regard it as a matter of primary importance so as to win still greater victories in revolution and
production." 28
It seems reasonable to view the criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao
as a device to engage the worker ( agricultural and industrial) in intellectual activity which will increase ( or maintain) revolutionary spirit.
To ,the extent to which the device succeeds, there will be no need to
unleash another Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with its excesses
and dangers. How long can such a course continue? How long can
criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao be meaningful in terms of its aims?
Surely the time will come when some substitute must be produced. If
such a time comes when the problems of succession are acute, revolution
in a violent form could well be the result. For now, the revolution would
seem to have reached an "Asia theory" end. 24 It could flare up quickly
and violently in response to events.
2s Ibid.
24 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of a Revolution, Random House, New York,
1965, pp . 226-227.

